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Abstract
We develop a multicriteria approach, based on a scalarization technique, in order to
analyze the trade off between economic growth and environmental outcomes in a frame-
work in which the economy and environment relation is bidirectional. On the one hand,
economic growth by stimulating production activities gives rise to emissions of pollutants
which deteriorate the environment. On the other hand, the environment affects economic
activities since pollution generates a production externality determining how much output
the economy can produce and reducing welfare. In this setting we show that optimality
dictates an initial overshooting followed by economic degrowth and rising pollution. This
implies that independently of the relative importance of economic and environmental fac-
tors, it is paradoxically optimal for the economy to asymptotically reach the maximum
pollution level that the environment is able to bear.
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1 Introduction
Since the first debates around sustainable development, it has been widely recognized the
existence of a clear trade off between economic growth and environmental preservation (WCED,
1987). Indeed, in order to allow for higher and higher output per capita to be reached, economic
growth requires the level of production activities to consistently increase over time, generating
thus rising pressure on the natural environment through the pollutant emissions generated as a
side-product of production. However, the health of the natural environment plays also a vital
role in economic activities by feeding back into production capabilities, since pollutant emissions
tend to reduce the amount of output the economy can produce for a given level of production
factors. Understanding the nature of such a mutual relation between economic growth and
environmental outcomes has been the main focus of a large and growing economics literature
(see Xepapadeas, 2003; and Brock and Taylor, 2005; for some recent surveys). Several papers
either analyze the extent to which it is possible to reconcile economic growth and environmental
preservation by pursuing specific win-win policies (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ansuategi
and Marsiglio, 2017; Marsiglio; 2017), or discuss how the nature of the economy-environment
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relation is complicated further by the presence of uncertainty in environmental or economic
dynamics (Soretz, 2007; Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas, 2012; La Torre et al., 2017) and
transboundary externalities associated with pollution diffusion (Ansuategi and Perrings, 2000;
La Torre et al., 2015; de Frutos and Mart´ın–Herrann, 2018), or argue why the economic growth
and environment relation is nonmonotonic and specifically U-shaped (John and Pecchenino,
1994; Stokey, 1998; Marsiglio et al., 2016).
Several of these works, from different points of view, stress that the feedback effects between
economic and environmental activities are particularly complicated and difficult to predict.
Some even suggest that effectively resolving the economic and environmental trade off is unlike
and thus it is imperative that economies start a process of degrowth to ensure the viability of the
natural environment (Georgescu–Roegen, 1971, 1977; Latouche, 2009; Kallis et al., 2012). Such
degrowth arguments emphasize that from an ecological perspective reducing the size of economic
production and consumption activities is not only desirable but also to a large extent inevitable.
Given the uncertainty in environmental and economic dynamics, understanding whether this
is actually the case is not simple but still its possibility suggests that effectively planning
sustainable development critically requires policymakers to consider not only economic goals
but also environmental goals when determining their policy interventions. A natural method
to do so consists of relying on a multicriteria approach in which economic and environmental
factors can be simultaneously accounted for in the definition of the objective function that
policymakers wish to optimize (see Roy and Vincke, 1981, for a concise discussion of the basis
of multicriteria analysis). Despite the popularity of multicriteria methods in environmental
sciences and other disciplines (see Ballestero and Romero, 1998; and Greco et al., 2016, for
some detailed surveys), only few attempts to introduce such an approach in economics have been
made thus far (Colapinto et al., 2017; Marsiglio and La Torre, 2016). Specifically, Colapinto et
al. (2017) analyze numerically through both scalarization and goal programming approaches
the intergenerational issues associated with sustainable development. Marsiglio and La Torre
(2016) rely on a scalarization technique to analyze explicitly how uncertainty in environmental
quality affects optimal policymaking. In this paper we wish to contribute to this scant literature
by developing a simple multicriteria approach to analyze the mutual relation between economic
growth and environmental outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bicriteria problem in which the
social planner cares both for economic and environmental goals, quantified by the consumption
level and the pollution stock, respectively.
The paper most closely related to ours is Marsiglio and La Torre’s (2016), which shows
that a typical macroeconomic model can be interpreted as a multicriteria problem, in which
the vectorial objective function is scalarized through some parameters representing the weight
attached to the different goals in such an objective function. Such a link between traditional
macroeconomic frameworks and multicriteria methods is very convenient since it allows to
bridge the economics and operational research literature, showing how the two disciplines can
borrow from each other in order to improve their approach to deal with real world problems.
Different from Marsiglio and La Torre (2016) in which the relation between economy and
environment is unidirectional (i.e., economic production determines the level of pollution de-
teriorating environmental quality), in our setup such a relation is bidirectional (i.e., economic
activities determine pollution but also pollution affects economic production through an exter-
nality effect). We show that in such a framework, independently of the weight attached to the
economic and environmental goals, optimality dictates (after an initial overshooting) economic
degrowth accompanied by rising pollution. This introduces a novel scenario, not yet considered
in the literature, which envisages decumulation of capital together with an increasing pollution
stock, thus suggesting that, different from what discussed in the degrowth literature, economic
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degrowth is neither always optimal nor an obvious solution to environmental problems. Indeed,
the economy will asymptotically reach the maximum pollution level that the environment can
effectively bear. Such a paradoxical result is intuitively due to the fact that at the end of the
planning horizon (i.e., asymptotically) the environment does not have any value left and as such
it is convenient to exploit it as much as possible in order to boost finite-time consumption. This
type of conclusion is somehow implicit in the definition of the objective function which, by being
based on a discounted utilitarian approach, does not attach any value to asymptotic quanti-
ties, and this is the reason why several works argue that in order to deal with issues related
to sustainability it would be best to review such a discounted utilitarian specification of the
objective function (Ramsey, 1928; von Weizcker, 1967; Chichilnisky et al., 1995; Chichilnisky,
1997).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our model which consists of a bicriteria
problem in which the social planner, who cares for both economic and environmental factors,
needs to determine the level of consumption and the technology level to employ in produc-
tion activities by accounting for the two-ways relation between economic and environmental
outcomes. Section 3 presents a reduction of the model which allows to substantially simplify
the analysis and derive closed-form solutions for the optimal policies and the optimal dynamic
paths. Section 4 characterizes such an optimal solution deriving most of our results which show
that, independently of the relative weight of economic and environmental goals, capital will
initially overshoot its long run level in order to then decrease over time, while pollution will
monotonically increase during the transition towards the long run equilibrium. This implies
that it is optimal for the economy to asymptotically reach the maximum pollution level that
the environment is able to bear. Section 5 explicitly characterizes the efficient frontier in or-
der to look more closely at the relation between the two (economic and environmental) goals,
showing that the frontier bows outward suggesting that the economic and environmental trade
off persists also with the optimal solution. Section 6 presents concluding remarks and proposes
directions for future research. Technicalities are postponed to Appendix A.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete-time Ramsey-type (1928) model of optimal growth where the social
planner, by taking into account economic and environmental constraints, chooses the level of
consumption, ct ≥ 0, and a technology level, 0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯ with z¯ measuring the maximal
technology level available, in an attempt to simultaneously achieve two conflicting goals, related
to economic and environmental performance respectively. The planner’s objective function is
thus characterized by a bicriteria functional, in which each criterion is represented by the
infinite discounted (0 < β < 1 is the rate of time preference) sum of the instantaneous utilities
associated with the respective goal, given by consumption and environmental quality, p¯ − pt,
where pt ≥ 0 denotes the level of pollution and p¯ > 0 the maximal pollution level that the
environment can bear. The instantaneous utility functions associated with consumption and
environmental quality are assumed to be logarithmic, uc (ct) = ln ct and up (pt) = ln (p¯− pt),
respectively; note that the utility associated with the environmental quality decreases with
pollution, which deteriorates the environment. Capital, kt ≥ 0, accumulation is given by the
difference between total net output (i.e., output adjusted for the technology level and net of
depreciation), yt > 0 and consumption: kt+1 = yt + (1− δ) kt − ct, where 0 < δ < 1 is the
depreciation rate. Total output is the product between output, qt > 0, and the technology level
given by zt. Output is produced through a Cobb-Douglas production function using capital as
its only input, qt = Dtk
α
t , where 0 < α < 1 represents the capital share of GDP, and Dt is
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the production externality associated with pollution. Pollution decreases the amount of output
the economy through the following damage function Dt = (1 + pt)
−φ, where φ > 0 denotes the
elasticity of the damage function effectively reducing output. Pollution accumulation is given
by the difference between flow emissions, et, and the natural pollution absorption as follows:
pt+1 = et+(1− η) pt, where 0 < η < 1 represents the natural pollution decay rate. Emissions are
proportional to total output according to et = µyt, where µ > 0 measures the environmental
inefficiency of economic production activities. As pollution negatively affects both utility—
through the term up (pt) = ln (p¯− pt)—and production—through the term Dt = (1 + pt)
−φ—
the social planner chooses the technology level 0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯ in order to contain the pollution
level pt. Hence, total output turns out to be given by yt = zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt . The planner
can choose between a continuum of technology levels 0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯ determining thus, given
the capital and pollution stocks, the level of total output. Note that total output reaches its
maximum potential in a pristine environment, i.e., when there is no pollution, pt = 0, in which
case total output equals yt = k
α
t when there is full capacity in production and the technology
level is equal to unity, that is zt = 1. A higher (lower) technology level zt > 1 (zt < 1)
allows to increase (decrease) total output favoring (deteriorating) capital accumulation but
also to increase (reduce) emissions increasing (decreasing) pollution accumulation and thus
deteriorating (improving) environmental quality.
Note that our setting envisages only capital, kt, and pollution, pt, accumulation and thus
rules out endogenous growth. Indeed there is a maximum capital level, k¯ > 0, that can be
sustained in the long run; that is, if the initial capital level, k0, lies above k¯, then capital is
doomed to decrease over time eventually converging to some steady value ks ≤ k¯. Keeping
this observation in mind, and noting that the environmental quality, measured by p¯ − pt,
cannot improve beyond the level p¯, corresponding to zero pollution, without loss of generality
we simplify notation by normalizing such level to one, that is, we set p¯ ≡ 1. As when pt =
p¯ ≡ 1 the utility associated with environmental quality up (pt) = ln (1− pt) tends to minus
infinity, we consider such an extreme event as unsustainable for the economy from the quality
of life perspective; on the other hand, when pt = 0 the economy enjoys a pristine environment
associated to zero utility, up (0) = 0. In the following, thus, we shall consider only values of
pollution stock between 0 and 1: 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1.
The social planner’s problem consists thus of choosing ct and zt in order to maximize the
following concave bicriteria functional, given the capital and pollution dynamic constraints,
and initial conditions, k0 > 0 and p0 ≥ 0:
max
{ct,zt}
∞
t=0
J = [J1, J2] =
[
∞∑
0
βt ln ct,
∞∑
0
βt ln (1− pt)
]
(1)
s.t.


kt+1 = zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt − ct
pt+1 = µzt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− η) pt
kt, pt, ct, zt ≥ 0, pt ≤ 1, zt ≤ z¯; k0, p0 given.
Note that the level of consumption, ct, and of the technology level, zt, impact on both the two
(economic and environmental) criteria: a higher consumption level is directly beneficial for the
economic goal J1 and, by determining the capital stock available in the future and therefore the
level of pollution, indirectly impacts on the environmental goal J2 as well. A higher technology
level allows to produce more and thus increases consumption possibilities but at the same time
increases pollution, contributing thus indirectly to both the first and the second goals. The
social planner by optimally choosing consumption and the technology level needs to balance
their effects on the two goals determining the best compromise between them.
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The above bicriteria problem can be simplified by means of a linear scalarization technique
as follows:
max
{ct,zt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
0
βt [νc ln ct + νp ln (1− pt)] (2)
s.t.


kt+1 = zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt − ct
pt+1 = µzt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− η) pt
kt, pt, ct, zt ≥ 0, pt ≤ 1, zt ≤ z¯; k0, p0 given,
where νc > 0 and νp > 0 measure the weight of each goal in the planner’s problem. By defining
θ = νp/νc > 0, and using the linearity properties of the summation operators, the scalarized
problem turns out to be completely equivalent to the following:
max
{ct,zt}
∞
t=0
W =
∞∑
0
βt [ln ct + θ ln (1− pt)] (3)
s.t.


kt+1 = zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt − ct
pt+1 = µzt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− η) pt
kt, pt, ct, zt ≥ 0, pt ≤ 1, zt ≤ z¯; k0, p0 given.
(4)
Similar to what discussed in Marsiglio and La Torre (2016), note that the scalarized objecting
function represents social welfare, W , which is the typical objective function in traditional
macroeconomic settings, in a context where the social planner’s instantaneous utility function
depends additively on consumption and environmental quality: u (ct, pt) = ln ct + θ ln (1− pt),
with θ representing the green preference parameter.
3 The Reduced Model
In order to find the closed-form solution for the above problem (3) we first reduce the model
by eliminating the control variables ct and zt. From the first dynamic constraint in (4) we get
ct = zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1, (5)
which, as ct ≥ 0, implies that capital must satisfy
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt. (6)
From the second dynamic constraint in (4) we get
µzt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt = pt+1 − (1− η) pt ⇐⇒ zt = (1 + pt)
φ k−αt
(
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt
)
, (7)
which must satisfy 0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯, that is:
zt ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ pt+1 ≥ (1− η) pt and zt ≤ z¯ ⇐⇒ pt+1 ≤ µz¯ (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− η) pt.
On the other hand, recall that pt ≤ 1 must hold for all t ≥ 0, which will be the prevalent
constraint in the reduced form of problem (3). Therefore, using the second constraint in (4),
pt+1 = µzt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− η) pt ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ zt ≤
(1 + pt)
φ k−αt [1− (1− η) pt]
µ
(8)
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must be satisfied. The last inequality in (8) suggests that the upper bound z¯ on the technology
level should be sufficiently large in order to always allow the social planner to choose a control
value zt yielding a pt+1 value arbitrarily close to 1 from below. In Proposition 1 we shall assume
that z¯ is large enough to guarantee the existence of an interior solution; more specifically,by
adding some more restrictions on the initial stock values k0 and p0, pt < 1 will hold for all
t ≥ 0. For now, we can safely claim that the admissible range for pt+1 is
(1− η) pt ≤ pt+1 ≤ 1. (9)
Replacing zt as in the second equation of (7) into (6) we obtain the admissible range for
capital,
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt,
while replacing the same zt into (5) we obtain the expression of consumption in terms of the
state variables,
ct =
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1, (10)
so that we may state the reduced problem associated with (3):
V (k0, p0) = max
{kt,pt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
0
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+ θ ln (1− pt)
}
(11)
s.t.


0 ≤ kt+1 ≤
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt
0 ≤ (1− η) pt ≤ pt+1 ≤ 1
k0, p0 given.
(12)
Note that under our assumptions problem (11) is characterized by a short-run utility in
which both logarithms are linear in the state variables kt, pt, kt+1, pt+1; hence, the objective
function is concave. Moreover, the range for both kt+1 and pt+1 in (12) turns out to be linear,
which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The compact correspondence
Γ (k, p) =
{
(k′, p′) ∈ R2+ : [(1− η) p ≤ p
′ ≤ 1] ∧
[
k′ ≤
1
µ
p′ −
1− η
µ
p+ (1− δ) k
]}
(13)
has a convex graph.
Hence, we can claim that problem (11) under the dynamic constraints (12) is concave. This
ensures the sufficiency of the first order conditions that we will derive to characterize its optimal
solution.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The Bellman equation associated with (11) is
V (k, p) = max
(k′,p′)∈Γ(k,p)
{
ln
[
1
µ
p′ −
1− η
µ
p+ (1− δ) k − k′
]
+ θ ln (1− p) + βV (k′, p′)
}
, (14)
where Γ (k, p) is the correspondence describing the feasible values for (k′, p′) defined in (13).
Next proposition fully characterizes the solution of our optimization problem (the proofs of the
proposition and other results, along with further technical details, are presented in Appendix
A).
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Proposition 1 Assume that the following conditions on parameters and on the arguments of
the value function, (k, p), hold:
z¯ =
2φ
µ
max
{
1
k
,
µδ
η
}
(15)
η >
1− β
2
+ δ, (16)
k >
1− η
µ (1− δ)
p+
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
, (17)
k < −
βθ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
µβθ (1− β) (1− δ)2
(1− η) p+
[βθ (1− β) + δ (1 + β2θ)] (η − δ)
µβθδ (1− β) (1− δ)2
. (18)
Then,
1. the solution of the Bellman equation (14) is the function
V (k, p) = ρ1 + ρ2 ln (ρ3k + ρ4p+ ρ5) + ρ6 ln (1− p) , (19)
where
ρ1 = −
lnµ
1− β
−
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
(
1 + βθ
1− β
)
−
βθ
1− β
ln (η − δ) +
β + βθ
(1− β)2
ln [β (1− δ)]
+
βθ
1− β
ln θ, (20)
ρ2 =
1 + βθ
1− β
, ρ3 = µ (1− δ) , ρ4 = − (1− η) , ρ5 = −
η − δ
δ
, ρ6 = θ; (21)
2. the optimal dynamics of capital and pollution are given by
kt+1 = γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 (22)
pt+1 = γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6, (23)
where
γ1 =
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
β (1− δ) ,
γ2 = −
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
β
(
1− η
µ
)
γ3 =
β [δ (2η − θ − δ)− βθ (1− δ) (η − δ)− η (η − θ)] + η (η − δ)
µδ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
,
γ4 = −
µβθ (1− β) (1− δ)2
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
, γ5 =
βθ (1− β) (1− δ) (1− η)
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
,
γ6 =
β2θ [δ (1 + η − δ)− η] + (βθ + δ) (η − δ)
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
;
3. the corresponding optimal policy for consumption and the technology level are given by
ct = γ
c
1kt + γ
c
2pt + γ
c
3 (24)
zt = (1 + pt)
φ k−αt (γ
z
1kt + γ
z
2pt + γ
z
3) , (25)
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where
γc1 =
γ4 − γ1 + 1− δ
µ
=
[βθ (1− µ) (1− δ) + η − δ] (1− β) (1− δ)
µ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
,
γc2 =
γ5 − γ2 − (1− η)
µ
= −
βθ [1−η − β (1− δ)] (1− µ) + (µ− β) (η − δ)
µ2 (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
(1− η) ,
γc3 =
γ6
µ
− γ3 = −
(1− β) (η − δ)
µδ (1 + βθ)
, γz1 =
γ4
µ
= −
βθ (1− β) (1− δ)2
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
,
γz2 =
γ5 − (1− η)
µ
=
βθ [1−η − β (1− δ)]− (η − δ)
µ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
(1− η) ,
γz3 =
γ6
µ
=
βθ [1− β (1− δ)] + δ
µδ (1 + βθ)
;
4. in the long run the economy will converge to its unique non-trivial (asymptotic) steady
state given by the pair
(ks, ps) =
(
η
µδ
, 1
)
. (26)
The first condition (15) allows for inequality (8) to hold for the optimal dynamics defined by
(22) and (23), that is, it guarantees a range for the technology level zt sufficiently large so that
pt+1 ≤ 1 is always an admissible choice, for any pt+1 arbitrarily close to 1. The RHS in (20),
in order to be defined, requires η > δ, which is implied by condition (16) as (1− β) /2 > 0;
that is, in order to have a meaningful solution for problem (3) the pollution stock must decay
faster than the pace at which capital depreciates. Note that coefficients ρ2, ρ3 and ρ6 in (21)
are positive, while, under the condition η > δ, coefficients ρ4 and ρ5 are negative. The technical
condition (17) has three purposes: (i) it guarantees that kt+1 in (22) is interior, i.e., it satisfies
0 < kt+1 < pt+1/µ − (1− η) pt/µ + (1− δ) kt for all t ≥ 0; (ii) together with condition (15),
it guarantees that pt+1 in (23) is such that pt+1 < 1 for all t ≥ 0; and (iii) it guarantees that
the first log in the RHS of (19) is well defined, that is, ρ3k + ρ4p + ρ5 > 0 holds. Condition
(17) postulates that there must be a sufficient amount of initial capital to compensate the
negative effects of the initial stock of pollution, both on production and utility. The last
technical condition (18) ensures that pt+1 in (23) is such that pt+1 > (1− η) pt; that is, under
the assumption (15), conditions (17) and (18) together imply that the optimal plan for the
pollution stock defined by (23) is interior as well.
Proposition 1 also states that optimal dynamics of both capital and pollution are linear in
the stock of capital and pollution. The same applies to the optimal policy for consumption,
while that for the technology level depends nonlinearly on both capital and pollution. The
most interesting result in Proposition 1 is related to the steady state outcome: it is optimal for
the economy to reach in the long run the maximum pollution level that the environment can
effectively bear. Since pollution affects production via an externality effect captured by the
damage function Dt = (1 + pt)
−φ, in the long run capital will achieve a strictly positive level
which depends both on economic (δ) and environmental factors (η and µ), which is clearly lower
than its maximal level, that is ks < k¯. This long run equilibrium represents what we can have
referred to as an unsustainable outcome since the utility associated with environmental quality
tends to minus infinity and as a result welfare tends to minus infinity as well. Such a paradoxical
result suggesting that optimality implies unsustainability in the long run is intuitively due to
the fact that at the end of the planning horizon (i.e., when the steady state is reached) the
environment does not have any value left and as such it is convenient to exploit it as much
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as possible in order to boost finite-time consumption. It it interesting to observe that the
scalarization parameter θ, which represents the green preference parameter, does not affect
in any way the long run equilibrium: higher or lower concern levels for the environment are
completely irrelevant in the long run. However, note that the steady state can only be reached
asymptotically; indeed, the value function (19) is not defined on (ks, ps) because the capital
value ks = η/ (µδ) does not satisfy condition (17).
The optimal trajectory generated by the dynamics (22) and (23) can be written in vector
form as [
kt+1
pt+1
]
=
[
γ1 γ2
γ4 γ5
] [
kt
pt
]
+
[
γ3
γ6
]
, (27)
which shows that the optimal dynamic for the capital and the pollution stock is an affine
function. It turns out (see the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A) that the matrix[
γ1 γ2
γ4 γ5
]
(28)
is singular; thus one eigenvalue is zero, λ1 = 0, while the other is λ2 = β (1− δ), so that it is
positive and strictly less than 1, and the steady state in (26) is globally stable. Solving the
general solution for the initial values (k0, p0) satisfying (17) and (18), we find the following
exact solution for the dynamical system (27):


kt = c2 [β (1− δ)]
t +
η
µδ
pt = −c2
µθ (1− β) (1− δ)
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
[β (1− δ)]t + 1,
(29)
where
c2 =
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
1 + βθ
[
k0
η − δ
−
(1− η) p0
µ (1− δ) (η − δ)
−
1
µδ (1− δ)
]
. (30)
In the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A we show that, under conditions (16) and (17),
c2 defined in (30) is strictly positive; therefore, the optimal plan defined by (29) is characterized
by a sequence of capital stocks, kt, that converges to the steady value k
s = η/ (µδ) defined in
(26) from above; that is, starting from any initial state (k0, p0) satisfying (17) and (18), all
optimal sequences kt generated by (22) contain capital levels which are all larger than the
asymptotic value ks = η/ (µδ). Note that this property holds also when the initial capital level
lies below the steady value, k0 < k
s = η/ (µδ). This is due to the singularity of the matrix
(28) which lets the optimal trajectory of capital jump on the line defined by the eigenvector
associated with the positive eigenvalue, λ2 = β (1− δ), right after the first iteration of (27); as
under condition (16) the slope of such line is negative, specifically, equal to
−
µθ (1− β) (1− δ)
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
< 0,
all optimal paths approach the steady state (ks, ps) = (η/ (µδ) , 1) from south-east, that is,
with values kt > η/ (µδ) and pt < 1. This suggests that the optimal dynamics imply that
capital initially overshoots its long run value while pollution falls below its long run value, and
along the transition to the steady state capital gradually decreases while pollution increases.
This implies that asymptotically pollution achieves the maximal level the environment can
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effectively bear while capital achieves a strictly positive level determined by both economic and
environmental factors.
Note that, after the initial overshooting, the optimal capital dynamic implies a situation of
degrowth in which the size of economic activities tends to shrink over time, consistent with what
discussed in the degrowth literature; however, the pollution dynamic implying increasing envi-
ronmental deterioration is in net contrast with such degrowth arguments. Indeed, our model
suggests that it is optimal at the beginning of the planning horizon to produce and consume a
lot (more than in the long run) and at the same time devote many resources to environmental
preservation (through the choice of the technology level), and then to gradually reduce produc-
tion and technological control efforts in order to achieve asymptotically the maximal level of
environmental degradation and a strictly positive capital level determined both by economic
and environmental factors. This type of result clearly suggests that, different from what dis-
cussed in the degrowth literature, economic degrowth is not always optimal and even when it
is (i.e., after the initial overshooting) degrowth goes hand-in-hand with environmental deterio-
ration; therefore, economic degrowth does not represent an obvious solution to environmental
problems. Note moreover that different from degrowth arguments, which are all qualitative
in nature, our results are optimally derived from a social planner’s multicriteria optimization
problem and such results hold true for every value of the scalarization parameter. Therefore,
even if the relative weight of the environmental goal is infinitely larger than the economic goal
(i.e., θ → ∞), which is somehow the implicit assumption underlying the degrowth point of
view, a full asymptotic exploitation of the natural environment is the optimal course of action.
5 The Efficient Frontier and Social Welfare
The exact solution (29) allows to derive both the Pareto frontier and social welfare. In order
to do so we need to determine the optimal value of the two criteria in problem 1, repre-
senting the economic goal J1 (k0, p0) =
∑∞
0 β
t ln ct and the environmental goal J2 (k0, p0) =∑∞
0 β
t ln (1− pt), which are both function of the initial stocks k0 and p0 and for which the
plans {ct}
∞
t=0 and {pt}
∞
t=0 are given by the optimal policies (24) and (23). To this purpose, let
us first define
G0 = µδ (1− δ) k0 − δ (1− η) p0 − (η − δ) ,
then (see the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A)
J1 ≡ J1 (k0, p0) =
∞∑
0
βt ln ct =
∞∑
0
βt ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
=
∞∑
0
βt ln
{
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]t
}
= ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
] ∞∑
0
βt + ln [β (1− δ)]
∞∑
0
tβt
=
1
1− β
ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
]
+
β
(1− β)2
ln [β (1− δ)] , (31)
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and
J2 ≡ J2 (k0, p0) =
∞∑
0
βt ln (1− pt) =
∞∑
0
βt ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
[β (1− δ)]t
]
= ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
] ∞∑
0
βt + ln [β (1− δ)]
∞∑
0
tβt
=
1
1− β
ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
]
+
β
(1− β)2
ln [β (1− δ)] . (32)
The above two expressions imply that optimality implies that the economic goal decreases
with the scalarization parameter θ, as
∂J1
∂θ
= −
β
(1− β) (1 + βθ)
< 0,
while the environmental goal increases with it, as
∂J2
∂θ
=
1
θ (1− β) (1 + βθ)
> 0.
This suggests that the optimal choice of the two control variables ct and zt does not allow to
solve the economic-environmental trade off, which persists also at the optimal solution and as
such the Pareto frontier will bow outward. Indeed, by rearranging the expression J1 in (31)
and plugging it into that of J2 in (32) we first obtain:
J2 = J1 +
1
1− β
ln
(
θµ
η − δ
)
,
and then, after solving the expression in (31) for θ and plugging the result into the above
equation, we get the explicit expression of the frontier:
J2 = J1 +
1
1− β
ln
{
(1− β)G0
µδ
[β (1− δ)]
β
1−β e−(1−β)J1 − 1
}
+
1
1− β
ln
[
µ
β (η − δ)
]
,
whose graphical representation is a nonlinear outward bowed curve, as shown in the left panel
of Figure 1.
It turns out that, even if the economic-environmental trade off still persists in the optimal
solution of the bicriteria problem, its scalarization giving rise to a unicriterion problem makes
such a trade off completely disappear. Indeed, using (31) and (32) we can explicitly derive
social welfare as a function of the scalarization parameter θ the follows:
W≡ W (k0, p0) = J1 + θJ2
=
1
1− β
ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
]
+
β
(1− β)2
ln [β (1− δ)]
+
θ
1− β
ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
]
+
βθ
(1− β)2
ln [β (1− δ)]
=
1 + θ
1− β
ln
{
(1− β)G0
δ (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]
β
1−β
}
+
1
1− β
ln
[
1
µ
(
θ
η − δ
)θ]
.
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Numerical simulations show that social welfare monotonically decreases with the scalarization
parameter, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. Hence, within the parameters’ range con-
sistent with Proposition 1, if θ increases, the effects of the decrease in (optimal) consumption
always dominate those of the decrease in (optimal) pollution, which in turn improves envi-
ronmental quality, thus neutralizing the trade off altogether. This means that putting more
weight on the environmental goal has a negative effect on social welfare, as the negative effects
associated with the economic goal more than offset the beneficial effects associated with the
environmental goal, and thus social welfare turns out to be monotonically decreasing with the
scalarization parameter.
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Figure 1: Efficient frontier (left) and social welfare (right).
A graphical representation of the efficient frontier and social welfare are given in Figure 1,
in which the parameter values are arbitrarily set in order to verify the conditions in Proposition
1 as follows: β = 0.96, δ = 0.1, η = 0.2, α = 0.33, φ = 2, µ = 0.5, k0 = 2.25 and p0 = 0.
Under these parameters’ values it turns out z¯ = 3.56, k¯ = (δ/z¯)
1
α−1 = 206.44, the steady
value for capital is ks = η/ (µδ) = 4, and conditions (16)–(18) are satisfied as η = 0.2 >
0.12 = (1− β) /2 + δ, k0 = 2.25 > 0.22 = (η − δ) / [µδ (1− δ)] and k0 = 2.25 < 21.26 =
{[βθ (1− β) + δ (1 + β2θ)] (η − δ)} /
[
µβθδ (1− β) (1− δ)2
]
. Note that we have chosen a value
for k0 very close to its lower bound in condition (17) for an initial pristine environment with p0 =
0 pollution. We can observe that the shapes of the frontier and of social welfare are consistent
with our above discussion. The above results, showing that the economic-environmental trade
off is present in the optimal solution of the bicriteria problem while it completely disappears
in the solution of the scalarized problem, suggest that the traditional economics approach
consisting of relying on a unicriterion objective function (i.e., social welfare) risks to oversimplify
the complicated nature of the sustainability problem.
6 Conclusion
Discussing sustainability requires to critically account for both economic and environmental
goals, which are to a large extent conflicting. In order to do so we rely on a multicriteria
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method based on a scalarization technique in order to analyze the trade off between economic
growth and environmental outcomes in a framework in which the economy and environment
relation is bidirectional. On the one hand, economic growth by stimulating production ac-
tivities gives rise to emissions of pollutants which deteriorate the natural environment. On
the other hand, the natural environment affects economic activities since pollution generates a
production externality determining how much output the economy can effectively produce. In
this setting we explicitly characterize the optimal solution showing that, independently of the
relative importance of economic and environmental factors, after an initial overshooting capital
decreases while pollution monotonically increases during the transitional path, implying that
it is optimal for the economy to asymptotically reach the maximum pollution level that the
natural environment can effectively bear. Such a paradoxical result is due to the fact that
asymptotically the environment does not have any value left and as such it is convenient to
exploit it as much as possible in order to boost finite-time consumption. To the best of our
knowledge, despite the huge number of works on the economic growth and environment rela-
tion, none has thus far been able to explicitly characterize the optimal dynamics in a setting
similar to ours in which the economy and the environment mutually affect each other.
Clearly the approach we adopt in this paper is a bit simplistic and the analysis could be ex-
tended along several directions in order to describe more realistically the economy-environment
relation. In particular, we have assumed that capital is bounded in order to mimic a situation
in which natural constraints limit the economy’s ability to accumulate assets. However, it may
well be possible that technological progress allows the economy to continually expand such a
bound, which could permit for sustained long run growth to occur. In such a setting it is
no longer obvious that optimality requires full exploitation of natural assets, but it may be
possible to find an asymptotic balance between economic and environmental goals. Extending
the analysis in order to take this into account is left for future research.
A Technical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The graph of the correspondence defined in (13) is defined as
GΓ =
{
(k, p, k′, p′) ∈ R4+ : (k
′, p′) ∈ Γ (k, p)
}
. (33)
We must prove that if (k0, p0, k
′
0, p
′
0) ∈ GΓ and (k1, p1, k
′
1, p
′
1) ∈ GΓ then the point
(kσ, pσ, k
′
σ, p
′
σ) = σ (k0, p0, k
′
0, p
′
0) + (1− σ) (k1, p1, k
′
1, p
′
1) ∈ GΓ as well for any 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
According to definition (13), the first and second properties respectively mean that
[(1− η) p0 ≤ p
′
0 ≤ 1] ∧
[
k′0 ≤
1
µ
p′0 −
1− η
µ
p0 + (1− δ) k0
]
(34)
[(1− η) p1 ≤ p
′
1 ≤ 1] ∧
[
k′1 ≤
1
µ
p′1 −
1− η
µ
p1 + (1− δ) k1
]
. (35)
The first conditions in (34) and (35) imply that
σ (1− η) p0 ≤ σp
′
0 ≤ σ and (1− σ) (1− η) p1 ≤ (1− σ) p
′
1 ≤ 1− σ,
which, summing up, lead to
(1− η) [σp0 + (1− σ) p1] ≤ σp
′
0 + (1− σ) p
′
1 ≤ σ + 1− σ = 1.
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As the first and the last inequalities above can be rewritten as
(1− η) pσ ≤ p
′
σ ≤ 1,
the first condition for (k′σ, p
′
σ) ∈ Γ (kσ, pσ) according to (13) is established. To prove the other
condition in (13), note that the second conditions in (34) and (35) imply that
σk′0 ≤ σ
1
µ
p′0 − σ
1− η
µ
p0 + σ (1− δ) k0 and
(1− σ) k′1 ≤ (1− σ)
1
µ
p′1 − (1− σ)
1− η
µ
p1 + (1− σ) (1− δ) k1,
which, summing up, lead to
σk′0 + (1− σ) k
′
1 ≤
1
µ
[σp′0 + (1− σ) p
′
1]−
1− η
µ
[σp0 + (1− σ) p1] + (1− δ) [σk0 + (1− σ) k1] ,
which can be rewritten as
k′σ ≤
1
µ
p′σ −
1− η
µ
pσ + (1− δ) kσ,
so that the second condition for (k′σ, p
′
σ) ∈ Γ (kσ, pσ) in (13) holds as well, and we can conclude
that (kσ, pσ, k
′
σ, p
′
σ) ∈ GΓ according to (33), as was to be shown.
As the function V (k, p) defined in (19) is unbounded from below, before proving Proposition
1 we recall the following verification principle (Lemma 2) that holds for unbounded functions.
Consider the general problem
V (x0) = sup
{xt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (xt, xt+1) (36)
s.t.


xt+1 ∈ Γ (xt) ∀t ≥ 0,
xt ∈ X ⊆ R
n ∀t ≥ 1,
x0 ∈ X is given,
where Γ : X → X is a compact, nonempty correspondence such that Γ (x) ⊆ X for all x ∈ X,
u : GΓ → R [GΓ denotes the graph of Γ according to (33)], and 0 < β < 1. We shall denote a
plan by (x0, {xt}
∞
t=0), or, shortly, (x0, {xt}); a plan (x0, {xt}) is said to be feasible if xt+1 ∈ Γ (xt)
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, we shall denote the objective function in (36) by
W (x0, {xt}) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu (xt, xt+1) , (37)
and its n-finite truncation by
Wn (x0, {xt}) =
n−1∑
t=0
βtu (xt, xt+1) . (38)
Let
w (x) = max
(y)∈Γ(x)
[u (x, y) + βw (y)] (39)
be its associated Bellman equation.
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Lemma 2 (A Verification principle) Let w (x) be a solution to the Bellman equation (39).
Then, if
1. lim inft→∞ β
tw (xt) ≤ 0 for all feasible plans (x0, {xt}), and
2. for any x0 and any feasible plan (x0, {xt}) there is another feasible plan (x0, {x
′
t}) origi-
nating from the same initial condition x0 that satisfies
(a) W (x0, {x
′
t}) =
∑∞
t=0 β
tu
(
x′t, x
′
t+1
)
≥
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (xt, xt+1) = W (x0, {xt}), and
(b) lim supt→∞ β
tw (x′t) ≥ 0,
then w (x) is the value function of (36), w (x) = V (x).
Proof. Fix arbitrarily an ε > 0 and consider the scalar ϕ = (1− β) /ε > 0. In view of (39),
given x0, there is some x1 ∈ Γ (x0) such that u (x0, x1) + βw (x1) > w (x0)−ϕ. Similarly, there
is a point x2 ∈ Γ (x1) such that u (x1, x2) + βw (x2) > w (x1) − ϕ, and so on. Therefore, this
process generates a feasible plan such that u (xt, xt+1) + βw (xt+1) > w (xt) − ϕ for all t ≥ 0.
By iterating all such terms up to t = n, it is easy to see that there always exist a feasible plan
(x0, {xt}) such that
w (x0) < Wn (x0, {xt}) + β
nw (xn) + ϕ
∞∑
t=0
βt
= Wn (x0, {xt}) + β
nw (xn) + ε
for any arbitrary ε > 0. Taking the lim infn→∞ on both sides we obtain
w (x0) ≤ W (x0, {xt}) + lim inf
n→∞
βnw (xn) + ε ≤ W (x0, {xt}) + ε,
where in the second inequality we used property 1 of Lemma 2. Hence, w (x0) ≤ W (x0, {xt}) ≤
V (x0).
On the other hand, by considering the feasible plan (x0, {x
′
t}) satisfying property 2 of Lemma
2 and again iterating the terms on the RHS of (39) from t = 0 to t = n, we get
w (x0) ≥ Wn (x0, {x
′
t}) + β
nw (x′n) .
Taking the lim supn→∞ on both sides and using properties 2a and 2b we obtain
w (x0) ≥ W (x0, {x
′
t}) + lim sup
n→∞
βnw (x′n) ≥ W (x0, {x
′
t}) ≥ W (x0, {xt}) ,
which, as (x0, {xt}) is any arbitrary feasible plan, implies w (x0) ≥ V (x0).
Therefore, w (x0) = V (x0) and the proof is complete.
Lemma 3 A plan (x0, {x
∗
t}) satisfying the Bellman equations (39) for all t ≥ 0 for the value
function w (x) = V (x) is optimal if and only if limt→∞ β
tV (x∗t ) = 0.
Proof. Assume that (x0, {x
∗
t}) satisfies (39) for all t ≥ 0 and that limt→∞ β
tV (x∗t ) = 0.
Then
V (x) = u
(
x∗t , x
∗
t+1
)
+ βV
(
x∗t+1
)
(40)
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for all t ≥ 0. By iterating the terms on the RHS in (40) from t = 0 to t = n, we get
V (x0) = Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) + β
nV (x∗n) .
Taking the limit as n→∞ of both sides we have
V (x0) = lim
t→∞
Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) + lim
t→∞
βtV (x∗t ) = W (x0, {x
∗
t}) ,
which establishes that (x0, {x
∗
t}) is optimal.
Conversely, assume that (x0, {x
∗
t}) is optimal. By iterating W (x0, {x
∗
t}) = u (x0, x
∗
1) +
βW
(
x∗1,
{
x∗1+t
})
we easily get
V (x0) = W (x0, {x
∗
t}) = Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) + β
nW
(
x∗n,
{
x∗n+t
})
,
that is,
βnW
(
x∗n,
{
x∗n+t
})
= V (x0)−Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) .
As W
(
x∗n,
{
x∗n+t
})
= V (x∗n) and limn→∞Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) = V (x0), taking the limit as n → ∞
of both sides in the last equation we have limt→∞ β
tV (x∗t ) = V (x0)− limn→∞Wn (x0, {x
∗
t}) =
V (x0)− V (x0) = 0 and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 1. To apply the Guess and verify method (see, e.g., Bethmann,
2007; 2013), the linearity of the terms inside the logarithm in (14) suggests the following form
for the value function:
V (k, p) = ρ1 + ρ2 ln (ρ3k + ρ4p+ ρ5) + ρ6 ln (1− p) ,
where ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5 and ρ6 are constant coefficients, so that (14) can be rewritten as
ρ1 + ρ2 ln (ρ3k + ρ4p+ ρ5) + ρ6 ln (1− p) = max
(k′,p′)∈Γ(k,p)
{ln [p′/µ− (1− η) p/µ+ (1− δ) k − k′]
+θ ln (1− p) + β [ρ1 + ρ2 ln (ρ3k
′ + ρ4p
′ + ρ5) + ρ6 ln (1− p
′)]} . (41)
The RHS in (41) is concave in k′ and p′ for all given (k, p); therefore, FOC on the RHS yield
a unique solution for k′, p′ provided that it is interior to the correspondence Γ (k, p) and the
system of equations that equate both partial derivatives to zero admits a unique solution. By
solving such system we find the following values for k′, p′:
(k′)
∗
=
β [ρ2ρ3 + µρ4 (ρ2 + ρ6)]
(ρ3 + µρ4) (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
[
(1− δ) k−
1− η
µ
p
]
+
βρ2ρ3
2 − [ρ4 + ρ5 + β (ρ5ρ6 − ρ2ρ4)]µρ3 − µ
2ρ4 (ρ5 + ρ4)
µρ3 (ρ3 + µρ4) (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
(42)
(p′)
∗
=
βµρ3ρ6
(ρ3 + µρ4) (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
[
1− η
µ
p− (1− δ) k
]
+
β (ρ2ρ3 + µρ2ρ4 − µρ5ρ6) + ρ3 + µρ4
(ρ3 + µρ4) (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
, (43)
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that is, both optimal values are affine functions of k and p. By substituting such values into
(41) we get
ρ1 + ρ2 ln (ρ3k + ρ4p+ ρ5) + ρ6 ln (1− p)
= ln
[
(1− δ)µρ3k − (1− η) ρ3p+ ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
µρ3 (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
]
+ θ ln (1− p) + βρ1
+ βρ2 ln
[
βρ2
(1− δ)µρ3k − (1− η) ρ3p+ ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
µ (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
]
+ βρ6 ln
[
βρ6
(1− δ)µρ3k − (1− η) ρ3p+ ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
(ρ3 + µρ4) (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)
]
= ln
[
(1− δ)µk − (1− η) p+
ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
ρ3
]
− ln [µ (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)] + θ ln (1− p) + βρ1
+ βρ2 ln
{
βρ2ρ3
[
(1− δ)µk − (1− η) p+
ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
ρ3
]}
− βρ2 ln [µ (1 + βρ2 + βρ6)]
+ βρ6 ln
{
βρ3ρ6
[
(1− δ)µk − (1− η) p+
ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
ρ3
]}
− βρ6 ln (ρ3 + µρ4)
− βρ6 ln [(1 + βρ2 + βρ6)]
= (1 + βρ2 + βρ6) ln
[
(1− δ)µk − (1− η) p+
ρ3 + µ (ρ4 + ρ5)
ρ3
]
− (1 + βρ2) lnµ− (1 + βρ2 + βρ6) ln (1 + βρ2 + βρ6) + θ ln (1− p) + βρ1
+ β (ρ2 + ρ6) ln (βρ3) + βρ2 ln ρ2 + βρ6 ln ρ6 − βρ6 ln (ρ3 + µρ4) ,
and by equating the coefficients of the homogeneous terms in both sides (also inside the argu-
ment of the first logarithm) we find the values for the coefficients listed in (20) and (21).
By substituting the coefficients in (20) and (21) in the expressions (42) and (43), after some
tedious algebra we obtain the optimal dynamics for capital and pollution as in (22) and (23).
By solving the system {
k = γ1k + γ2p+ γ3
p = γ4k + γ5p+ γ6,
where the coefficients γi, i = 1, . . . , 6, are listed in point 2 of Proposition 1, for k and p the
unique steady state (ks, ps) = (η/ (µδ) , 1) as in (26) is found.
The upper bound z¯ for the technology index defined in condition (15) allows for the existence
of optimal values zt that satisfy inequality (8), that is, such that pt+1 ≤ 1. To see this, note
that from the second inequality in (8) it follows that
z¯ ≥
(1 + pt)
φ k−αt [1− (1− η) pt]
µ
must hold for all feasible sequence {kt, pt}; thus, recalling that 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1 we can consider the
following upper bound of the RHS above:
(1 + pt)
φ k−αt [1− (1− η) pt]
µ
≤
2φ
µkαt
≤
2φ
µmin {k0, η/ (µδ)}
=
2φ
µ
max
{
1
k0
,
µδ
η
}
,
which is condition (15) for p = p0. The second inequality holds thanks to the fact that, as we
shall see in the following, the optimal sequence kt defined by (22) converges monotonically to
the steady value ks = η/ (µδ).
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Conditions (17) and (18) on the initial capital stock guarantee that the expressions in the
RHS of (42) and (43) define points (k′)∗ and (p′)∗ which are interior points of the correspondence
Γ (k, p) defined in (13), so that the whole recursive plan defined by (22) and (23) contain interior
points as well. We shall establish this property in the following steps.
We first show that if conditions (17) and (18) hold for (k0, p0), then they hold for all (kt, pt),
for all t ≥ 1. Suppose that (17) holds for (kt, pt), then it can be shown that
1− η
µ (1− δ)
=
(1− η) γ5 − µ (1− δ) γ2
µ (1− δ) γ1 − (1− η) γ4
and
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
=
(1− η) γ6 − µ (1− δ) γ3 + (η − δ) /δ
µ (1− δ) γ1 − (1− η) γ4
,
where the coefficients γi, i = 1, . . . , 6, are listed in point 2 of Proposition 1. Note that condition
(16) implies that γ1 > 0 for all admissible parameters’ values; this is because
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ > 0 (44)
is always true when β (1− δ) ≥ 1− η, and it holds also when β (1− δ) < 1− η provided that
η > (1− β) /2 + δ. Thus, as γ4 is clearly negative, µ (1− δ) γ1 − (1− η) γ4 > 0 and condition
(17) for (kt, pt) is equivalent to
kt >
(1− η) γ5 − µ (1− δ) γ2
µ (1− δ) γ1 − (1− η) γ4
pt +
(1− η) γ6 − µ (1− δ) γ3 + (η − δ) /δ
µ (1− δ) γ1 − (1− η) γ4
⇐⇒ γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 >
1− η
µ (1− δ)
(γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6) +
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
⇐⇒ kt+1 >
1− η
µ (1− δ)
pt+1 +
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
,
so that (kt+1, pt+1) satisfies condition (17) as well. Assume now that (kt, pt) satisfies condition
(18) and let
A = −
βθ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
µβθ (1− β) (1− δ)2
(1− η) and B =
[βθ (1− β) + δ (1 + β2θ)] (η − δ)
µβθδ (1− β) (1− δ)2
,
(45)
so that by assumption kt < Apt + B. Then it can be shown that
Aγ5 − γ2
γ1 − Aγ4
=
1− η
µ (1− δ)
= A+
(1− η) (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
µβθ (1− β) (1− δ)2
> A, (46)
where the last inequality holds because (η − δ) > 0 under condition (16). We have shown
before that γ1 > 0; however, A < 0 and γ4 < 0, so that the sign of the denominator γ1 − Aγ4
can be either positive or negative. It turns out that γ1−Aγ4 = β (1− δ)− (1− η), so the sign
of the latter expression determines whether it is positive or negative. Hence, to study a similar
inequality for parameter B we consider three separate cases.
1. If γ1 − Aγ4 = β (1− δ)− (1− η) > 0, then it can be shown that
Aγ6 − γ3 + B
γ1 − Aγ4
= B +
[1− β (1− δ)] (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
µβθ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] (1− β) (1− δ)2
> B, (47)
where the last inequality holds because (η − δ) > 0 under condition (16) and
[β (1− δ)− (1− η)] > 0 by assumption. Therefore, using both inequalities in (46) and
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(47), condition (18) for (kt, pt) implies:
kt < Apt + B =⇒ kt <
Aγ5 − γ2
γ1 − Aγ4
pt +
Aγ6 − γ3 + B
γ1 − Aγ4
⇐⇒ γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 < A (γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6) + B
⇐⇒ kt+1 < Apt+1 + B,
so that (kt+1, pt+1) satisfies condition (18) as well.
2. If γ1 − Aγ4 = β (1− δ)− (1− η) < 0, then it can be checked that
Aγ6 − γ3 + B
γ1 − Aγ4
=
1− η
µδ (1− δ)
+
η (1 + βθ) (η − δ)
µβθ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] (1− β) (1− δ)2
<
1− η
µδ (1− δ)
, (48)
where the last inequality holds because (η − δ) > 0 under condition (16) and
[β (1− δ)− (1− η)] < 0 by assumption, so that the second term in the middle expression
is strictly negative. Therefore, using the first equality in (46) and the last inequality in
(48), condition (17) for (kt, pt) implies:
kt >
1− η
µ (1− δ)
pt +
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
=⇒ kt >
Aγ5 − γ2
γ1 − Aγ4
pt +
Aγ6 − γ3 +B
γ1 − Aγ4
⇐⇒ (γ1 − Aγ4) kt < (Aγ5 − γ2) pt + Aγ6 − γ3 + B
⇐⇒ γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 < A (γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6) + B
⇐⇒ kt+1 < Apt+1 + B,
where in the third step we used the assumption γ1 − Aγ4 < 0. Hence, this time thanks
to condition (17), (kt+1, pt+1) satisfies condition (18) as well.
3. If γ1 − Aγ4 = β (1− δ) − (1− η) = 0, then, after replacing 1 − η = β (1− δ) in the
expression of A defined in (45) and in all coefficients γi, i = 1, . . . , 6, as listed in the point
2 of Proposition 1, one gets
γ1 − Aγ4 = 0, Aγ5 − γ2 = 0, and Aγ6 − γ3 + B =
η (1 + βθ)
µβθ (1− δ)
> 0,
which, once again, imply
(γ1 − Aγ4) kt < (Aγ5 − γ2) pt + Aγ6 − γ3 + B
⇐⇒ γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 < A (γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6) + B
⇐⇒ kt+1 < Apt+1 + B,
so that (kt+1, pt+1) satisfies condition (18) for all t ≥ 0.
Equipped with the property that conditions (17) and (18) hold for all (kt, pt), for all t ≥ 1,
we are ready to verify that the plan (kt, pt) defined by (22) and (23) contain interior points for
all t ≥ 0. Specifically, the followings hold.
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1. As γ1 > 0, after some tedious algebra we have
kt+1 = γ1kt + γ2pt + γ3 > γ1
[
1− η
µ (1− δ)
pt +
η − δ
µδ (1− δ)
]
+ γ2pt + γ3 ≡
η
µδ
> 0, (49)
where the first equality is (22) and in the first inequality we used condition (17);
2. it also can be shown that (17) is equivalent to
kt >
[γ5 − µγ2 − (1− η)] pt + γ6 − µγ3
µγ1 − γ4 − µ (1− δ)
,
which, in turn, as µγ1 − γ4 − µ (1− δ) = µ (1− β) (1− δ) / (1 + βθ) < 0 and using both
(22) and (22), is a equivalent to kt+1 < pt+1/µ − (1− η) pt/µ + (1− δ) kt, which, joint
with (49) establishes that the sequence kt generated by (22) is interior for all t ≥ 0.
3. After the usual tedious algebra it can be shown that condition (18) is equivalent to
kt <
1− η − γ5pt − γ6
γ4
,
which, in turn, as γ4 is clearly strictly negative and using (22), is equivalent to pt+1 =
γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6 > (1− η) pt;
4. similarly, it can be shown that (17) is equivalent to
kt >
1− γ5pt − γ6
γ4
,
which, in turn, as γ4 < 0 and using (23), is a equivalent to pt+1 = γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6 < 1,
which, joint with pt+1 > (1− η) pt, establishes that the sequence pt generated by (23) is
interior for all t ≥ 0.
Incidentally, note that (49) implies that all optimal plans converge to the steady value
ks = η/ (µδ) defined in (26) from above; that is, starting from any initial state (k0, p0) satisfying
(17) and (18), all optimal sequences k∗t generated by (22) contain capital levels which are all
larger than the asymptotic value ks = η/ (µδ). This observation also explains condition (15).
We now apply Lemma 2 to show that the function V (k, p) defined in (19) is indeed the
value function of problem (11). To establish Property 1 of the Lemma recall that there is a
maximum capital level, k¯ > 0, that can be sustained in the long run: as pt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0,
from the first constraint in (4) such upper bound is easily obtained noting that
kt+1 ≤ zt (1 + pt)
−φ kαt + (1− δ) kt ≤ z¯k
α
t + (1− δ) kt
and then solving k = z¯kα + (1− δ) k for k, which yields k¯ = (δ/z¯)
1
α−1 . Then
V (k, p) = ρ1 +
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
[
µ (1− δ) k − (1− η) p−
η − δ
δ
]
+ θ ln (1− p)
≤ ρ1 +
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
[
µ (1− δ) (δ/z¯)
1
α−1 −
η − δ
δ
]
= M,
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so that lim inft→∞ β
tV (kt, pt) ≤ limt→∞ β
tV (kt, pt) = M limt→∞ β
t = 0.
To show that Property 2 of Lemma 2 holds as well recall the notation
W ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) =
∞∑
0
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+θ ln (1− pt)} . (50)
We consider two types of feasible plans satisfying condition (17):
i) those satisfying W ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) > −∞ and
ii) those satisfying W ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) = −∞.
Plans of type (i) necessarily satisfy
lim
t→∞
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+ θ ln (1− pt)
}
= 0. (51)
Note that under our assumptions both arguments of the logs in the last expression are bounded
from above; therefore, both of them can only escape to −∞, and, as 0 < (1− β) / (1 + βθ) < 1,
we can safely claim that the limit in (51) implies
lim
t→∞
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+
θ (1− β)
1 + βθ
ln (1− pt)
}
= 0 (52)
as well. Condition (17) implies that
1
µ
pt+1 − kt+1 ≤ −
η − δ
µδ
,
so that
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
≤ ln
[
(1− δ) kt −
1− η
µ
pt −
η − δ
µδ
]
= ln
[
µ (1− δ) kt − (1− η) pt −
η − δ
δ
]
− lnµ, (53)
and thus
lim sup
t→∞
βtV (kt, pt)
= lim sup
t→∞
βt
{
ρ1 +
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
[
µ (1− δ) kt − (1− η) pt −
η − δ
δ
]
+ θ ln (1− pt)
}
=
1 + βθ
1− β
lim sup
t→∞
βt
{
ln
[
µ (1− δ) kt − (1− η) pt −
η − δ
δ
]
+
θ (1− β)
1 + βθ
ln (1− pt)
}
≥
1 + βθ
1− β
lim sup
t→∞
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+ lnµ+
θ (1− β)
1 + βθ
ln (1− pt)
}
=
1 + βθ
1− β
lim
t→∞
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
pt+1 −
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − kt+1
]
+
θ (1− β)
1 + βθ
ln (1− pt)
}
+
1 + βθ
1− β
(lnµ) lim
t→∞
βt = 0,
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where in the first inequality we used (53) while the last equality holds because of (52). Therefore
conditions 2a and 2b of Lemma 2 hold (with equality) for the (same) plan ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}) =
((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) when the latter is of type (i).
As far as plans ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) of type (ii) are concerned, we take the optimal plan
generated by (22) and (23) as reference plan ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}), that is, we calculate the exact
solution of the difference equation (27):[
kt+1
pt+1
]
=
[
γ1 γ2
γ4 γ5
] [
kt
pt
]
+
[
γ3
γ6
]
.
Through direct computation it is easily seen that the matrix (28) characterizing the dynamic
(27) happens to be singular and has two eigenvalues: λ1 = 0 and λ2 = β (1− δ). As λ2 < 1 the
steady state in (26) is globally stable. The associated eigenvectors are:
 1µ (1− δ)
1− η

 for λ1 = 0 and

 1
−
µθ (1− β) (1− δ)
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ

 for λ2 = β (1− δ) .
Note that condition (44) implies that the second eigenvector—that associated to the positive
eigenvalue—has negative slope. To compute the exact solution we solve the general solution

kt = c2 [β (1− δ)]
t +
η
µδ
pt = −c2
µθ (1− β) (1− δ)
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
[β (1− δ)]t + 1,
for the initial values (k0, p0) in t = 0, that is, we solve

k0 = c1 + c2 [β (1− δ)]
t +
η
µδ
p0 = c1
µ (1− δ)
1− η
− c2
µθ (1− β) (1− δ)
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
[β (1− δ)]t + 1,
for the constants c1 and c2, yielding the values
c1 =
θ (1− β) (1− η)
(η − δ) (1 + βθ)
k0 +
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
µ (1− δ) (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
(1− η) p0
−
θ (1− β) + δ (1 + βθ)
µδ (1− δ) (1 + βθ)
(1− η) ,
c2 =
θ [β (1− δ)− (1− η)] + η − δ
1 + βθ
[
k0
η − δ
−
(1− η) p0
µ (1− δ) (η − δ)
−
1
µδ (1− δ)
]
.
Note that c2 > 0 holds because of condition (44) and because the initial values (k0, p0) satisfy
(16) and (17), which imply that the term in square bracket is strictly positive.
Using the exact solution just found for the optimal plan ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}) we can elaborate
the argument of the first log in the welfare function W ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}) defined in (50) as
1
µ
p′t+1 −
1− η
µ
p′t + (1− δ) k
′
t − k
′
t+1 =
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]t ,
where, to simplify notation, we have set
G0 = µδ (1− δ) k0 − δ (1− η) p0 − (η − δ) .
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Note that under (17) G0 > 0 certainly holds. Similarly, the argument in the first log of the
function V (k′t, p
′
t) defined in (19) becomes
µ (1− δ) k′t − (1− η) p
′
t −
η − δ
δ
=
G0
δ
[β (1− δ)]t ,
while the argument in the second log of both functions W and V becomes
1− p′t =
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]t .
Hence, condition 2a of Lemma 2 holds (with strict inequality) for our reference (optimal) plan
((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}) with respect to any given plan ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) such that
W ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) = −∞ as
W ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t})
=
∞∑
0
βt
{
ln
[
1
µ
p′t+1 −
1− η
µ
p′t + (1− δ) k
′
t − k
′
t+1
]
+ θ ln (1− p′t)
}
=
∞∑
0
βt
{
ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]t
]
+ θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
[β (1− δ)]t
]}
=
∞∑
0
βt
{
ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
]
+ t ln [β (1− δ)] + θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
]
+ θt ln [β (1− δ)]
}
= ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
] ∞∑
0
βt + (1 + θ) ln [β (1− δ)]
∞∑
0
tβt + θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
] ∞∑
0
βt
=
1
1− β
{
ln
[
(1− β)G0
µδ (1 + βθ)
]
+
β (1 + θ) ln [β (1− δ)]
1− β
+ θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
]}
> −∞ = W ((k0, p0) , {kt, pt}) .
Similarly, condition 2b of Lemma 2 holds for our reference (optimal) plan ((k0, p0) , {k
′
t, p
′
t}) as
lim sup
t→∞
βtV (k′t, p
′
t)
≥ lim
t→∞
βtV (k′t, p
′
t) = lim
t→∞
βt
{
ρ1 +
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
[
µ (1− δ) k − (1− η) p−
η − δ
δ
]
+ θ ln (1− p)
}
= lim
t→∞
βt
{
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
[
G0
δ
[β (1− δ)]t
]
+ θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
]
+ θt ln [β (1− δ)]
}
=
1 + βθ
1− β
ln
(
G0
δ
)
lim
t→∞
βt + θ ln
[
θ (1− β)G0
δ (η − δ) (1 + βθ)
]
lim
t→∞
βt
+
(
1 + βθ
1− β
+ θ
)
ln [β (1− δ)] lim
t→∞
(
tβt
)
= 0.
As we have just found that the plan (k∗t , p
∗
t ) generated by (22) and (23) satisfies
limt→∞ β
tV (k∗t , p
∗
t ) = 0, Lemma 3 establishes that such plan is indeed optimal.
Finally, we replace the expressions of (22) and (23) into (7) and (10) to find the optimal
23
paths of consumption and production capacity index to obtain:
ct =
1
µ
(γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6)−
1− η
µ
pt + (1− δ) kt − γ1kt − γ2pt − γ3
=
γ4 − γ1 + 1− δ
µ
kt +
γ5 − γ2 − (1− η)
µ
pt +
γ6
µ
− γ3
= γc1kt + γ
c
2pt + γ
c
3
zt = (1− pt)
−φ k−αt
[
1
µ
(γ4kt + γ5pt + γ6)−
1− η
µ
pt
]
= (1− pt)
−φ k−αt
[
γ4
µ
kt +
γ5 − (1− η)
µ
pt +
γ6
µ
]
= (1− pt)
−φ k−αt (γ
z
1kt + γ
z
2pt + γ
z
3) ,
so that the expressions of the coefficients γc1, γ
c
2, γ
c
3, γ
z
1 , γ
z
2 , γ
z
3 , correspond to those below
conditions (24) and (25) in point 3 if Proposition 1.
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